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Gal￿ (1999) used a VAR with productivity and hours worked to argue that technology
shocks are negatively correlated with labor and are unimportant for the business cycle. More
recently, Beaudry and Portier (2003) studied a VAR in productivity and stock prices. Re-
markably, they found that the component which has a permanent impact on productivity is
almost identical to that which has no immediate impact on productivity. Moreover, either of
these components explains most business cycle variation. Like Gal￿￿ s results, these observa-
tions are inconsistent with early RBC models, but on the other hand they contradict Gali￿ s
claim that technology shocks are unimportant for cycles.
In this paper, we study trivariate VARs in productivity, hours worked, and stock prices
to see how these apparently contradictory results can be reconciled. We ￿nd one VAR
speci￿cation that qualitatively and quantitatively matches the ￿ndings of Gal￿ (so that long-
run technology shocks drive hours down), and a second speci￿cation that matches the main
￿ndings of Beaudry and Portier (so that long-run technology shocks increase hours, are
similar to the short-run shock to stock prices, and play a major role in generating business
cycles). Surprisingly, the di⁄erence between these two speci￿cations has nothing to do with
estimating in levels or in di⁄erences, or with running VARs or VECMs, or with the ordering
of variables. The only di⁄erence between the two speci￿cations lies in which productivity
variable is used: labor productivity (to generate results like Gal￿￿ s) or TFP (to generate
results like those of Beaudry and Portier). Both the original Beaudry and Portier estimations,
as well as our ￿ndings on the productivity speci￿cation, add to the evidence that Gal￿￿ s
￿ndings are not robust. Apparently the cyclical role of technology shocks is only picked up
when a su¢ ciently cyclical productivity series is used in the estimation.
11 Introduction
A recent literature aims to test the basic real business cycle (RBCLike) theory of Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) by studying the e⁄ects of productivity
shocks in the context of vector autoregressions (VARs). Just as Blanchard and Quah (1989)
sorted shocks into "demand￿and "supply￿components, the more recent papers classify impulses
into "technology￿and "non-technology￿components.
The in￿ uential paper of Gal￿ (1999) constructs a VAR with productivity and hours worked.
He separates the series into two components: the part that does not have any permanent e⁄ect
on productivity, and that which does, which he interprets as a technology shock. He ￿nds that
the non-technology component is responsible for most variation at business cycle frequencies,
and that the initial impact of a technology shock on labor is negative. Both these observations
appear seriously inconsistent with the RBC theory that business cycles are due in large part to
technological innovations.
More recently, Beaudry and Portier (2004) study a VAR in productivity and stock prices.
Since di⁄erent RBC papers have allowed for temporary or permanent productivity shocks as
driving forces for business cycles, they consider two identi￿cation strategies for separating out the
technological component of the data. Their "short-run￿identi￿cation separates the component
that has no immediate impact on productivity from that which does, while their "long-run￿
identi￿cation separates the component that has no permanent impact on productivity from
that which does. Remarkably, they ￿nd that the component which has a permanent impact
on productivity is almost identical to that which has no immediate impact on productivity.
Moreover, either one of these components explains most business cycle variation.
Like Gal￿￿ s results, these observations are inconsistent with the early RBC models in which
booms are responses to increases in the current level of productivity. Nonetheless, Beaudry and
Portier￿ s results leave open the possibility of an alternative technology-based theory of the busi-
ness cycle￿they argue that technological changes are "news￿which could stimulate the economy
in the short run even if they do not immediately a⁄ect productivity. Thus, while both papers
2could be interpreted as evidence against RBC theory, they appear to provide contradictory ev-
idence on the sources of business cycles: Gal￿ discards permanent shocks to productivity as a
cause of business cycles, while Beaudry and Portier ￿nd them to be the main cause of cycles.
In this paper, we ask how these apparently contradictory results can be reconciled. If the
results are robust, and are not due to subtle di⁄erences in data de￿nitions (the measure of
productivity used by Gal￿ is output per hour worked, while Beaudry and Portier use TFP), then
it must be the case that the permanent productivity component extracted from a VAR with
hours worked is very di⁄erent from that extracted from a VAR with stock prices. To explore this
issue, we study a trivariate VAR with productivity, hours, and stock prices, and we ask what
identi￿cation strategies give us results like those of Gal￿ or like those of Beaudry and Portier.
2 Related literature
3 Econometric method
The ￿rst step of this paper is to reproduce Gal￿ (1999) and Beaudry and Portier￿ s (2004) results.
To this end, ￿rst we estimate a bivariate VAR representation of the series considered by these
authors. Once we have the VAR estimation, we can recover the Wold representation that takes










where C(L) = I +
P1
i=1 CiLi; and the vector ￿t = [￿1;t;￿2;t]0 is the vector of reduced form
errors, correlated perturbations with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix equal to ￿: In
the analysis below,
Gal￿ (1999) Beaudry-Portier (2003)
￿xt labor productivity TFP
￿yt hours stock prices (S&P500)
Given this Wold representation the idea is to recover the structural representation, that
is, the one with orthogonalized errors. While some identi￿cations are more easily theoretically
motivated than others, we mechanically explore a variety of speci￿cations in order to understand
the di⁄erences between Gal￿ and BP results. In particular, we try imposing both short run and
long run restrictions. Gal￿ (1999) only considers a long run identi￿cation, whereas Beaudry and
Portier (2004) analyze both short and long run identi￿cations.
33.1 Short run identi￿cation















we need to compute the distributed lag ￿(L) =
P1
i=0 ￿iLi: To this end we compute the trans-
formation matrix ￿0 such that
￿￿1
0 ￿(￿￿1
0 )0 = I; or ￿0￿0
0 = ￿:
However, since the above system has one more variable than equations, it is necessary to add a
restriction to pin down a particular solution. In the short run, this is done by computing the







in which b = 0; that is, we impose that the shock to the second variable not to have a short run
e⁄ect on the ￿rst variable. From here, we can obtain ￿i = Ci￿0; for i > 0:
3.2 Long run identi￿cation











however, the procedure now di⁄ers from the one above, and therefore, we have a di⁄erent
distributed lag ~ ￿(L): This time
~ ￿(L)~ ￿(L)0 = C(L)￿C(L)0;
we do not know ￿; that is why we need to estimate it, ^ ￿; using this estimate we have,
~ ￿(L)~ ￿(L)0 = C(L)^ ￿C(L)0;
4that is, in terms of matrices of long-run multipliers we have,
~ ￿(1)~ ￿(1)0 = C(1)^ ￿C(1)0;
where ~ ￿(1) is the (lower triangular) Cholesky decomposition of C(1)^ ￿C(1)0: Then recover the
lag polynomial applying
~ ￿(L) = C(L)C(1)￿1~ ￿(1)
In the long run, the restriction we impose is ~ ￿1
12 = 0; that is, we require the shock to the second
variable not to have any long run e⁄ect on the ￿rst variable.
4 Data description
In this section we analyze the series to work with in the paper. Before putting together the two
contrasting literatures, we attempt to reproduce independently the two main results reported
in the literature. That is, we ￿rst reproduce Gal￿￿ s 1999 results and then Beaudry and Portier￿ s
2003 results. To this end, we collect data as close as possible to those employed by these authors.
In both cases data correspond to postwar US.
To reproduce Gal￿￿ s 1999 results we get data for labor productivity and hours worked. The
sample considered is the same as in Gal￿ and Rabanal (2004) and runs quarterly from 1948:1 to
2002:4. Labor productivity is computed as the ratio between the nonfarm business sector output,
OUTNFB, and total hours in the nonfarm business sector, HOANBS.1 The second variable in
the VAR is nonfarm business sector: hours of all persons, that is HOANBS. (The VAR is setup
in logs and ￿rst di⁄erences.)
For Beaudry and Portier￿ s results we need data on total factor productivity (TFP) and stock
prices. The sample runs from 1950:1 to 2004:1, also using quarterly data. Beaudry and Portier











where Y denotes real GDP, H is total hours, and KS is capital services. As in Gal￿, we
concentrate here on the nonfarm private business sector. The labor share, ￿ sh; is 67:66% which
1Source: FREDII.
5corresponds to the average value of the annual series reported by the BLS. Capital services
measures the services derived from the stock of physical assets and software. This series is also
annual so we need to interpolate to obtain a quarterly series. As Beaudry and Portier, we assume
constant growth within the quarters of the same year. Output (Y) and hours (H) are quarterly
seasonally adjusted nonfarm business measures, from 1947:1-2004:1 (also from the US BLS).
The second series refers to stock prices. Beaudry and Portier use the quarterly Standards &
Poors 500 Composite Stock Prices Index (S&P500), de￿ ated by the seasonally adjusted implicit
prices de￿ ator of GDP and transformed in per capita terms by dividing it by the population
aged 15 to 64. As the population series is annual, it has been interpolated assuming constant
growth within the quarters of the same year.
Next, the idea is to check for stationarity of the series in order to estimate the model in
the most appropriate way. We performed unit root analysis on all the series. The results are
reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Unit root tests
Series ^ ￿￿ Z[^ ￿￿] Series ^ ￿￿ Z[^ ￿￿]
log(Y=H) ￿2:0974 ￿2:3727 ￿log(Y=H) ￿7:4593 ￿16:8985
log(H) ￿3:4218 ￿3:1899 ￿log(H) ￿6:8424 ￿7:6315
log(SP500) ￿1:4182 ￿1:5180 ￿log(SP500) ￿6:5888 ￿9:8694
log(TFP) ￿2:5687 ￿3:2179 ￿log(TFP) ￿8:9017 ￿9:4342
t ￿ statistic for the null hypothesis of a unit root in the level or the ￿rst di⁄erence
of each time series, ADF and Phillips-Perron tests with 4 lags, trend and intercept.
The 5 percent critical value for the tests is -3.43.
Following the literature, these tests are based on OLS regressions of the augmented Dickey-
Fuller form





The Table shows the statistics for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron
analyses for unit root in time series, for the logs of each of the series considered below. From
these tests, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that each of the series considered in the analysis
are integrated of order one, neither in levels nor in di⁄erences at a 5% con￿dence level. Therefore,
we setup our VARs in di⁄erences.
6In spite of these tests we will run VARs both in levels and in di⁄erences, since there is
currently a big debate in the literature on the presence of a unit root in the hours series.
Interestingly, in contrast to the claims of recent papers we ￿nd that using DVARs or LVARs is
not crucial for our results.
5 Reproducing Gal￿￿ s results
In this section we perform the same analysis as in Gal￿ (1999) and Gal￿ and Rabanal (2004).
That is, we estimate a bivariate VAR in labor productivity and hours. In order to compare the
results of the two papers objective of this paper, we perform both short and long run restrictions
on the VARs in order to identify technology and nontechnology shocks. In all the ￿gures, we
refer to labor productivity as PTY.
Figure 1 reports the impulse response functions for a 1% shock to labor productivity (top
row), and to hours (bottom row) for the short run identi￿cation. The two left panels show the
impulse responses to short run technology shocks.
Productivity jumps to plateau at 7e-3. Hours converge to plateau at 5e-3. Slight overshooting
in both cases. That is, a short run shock to PTY has a permanent e⁄ect on it, and also on
hours.
The right panels report the impulse responses to short run nontechnology shocks. After very
small rise, productivity converges DOWN to permanently lower level at -3e-3. Hours converge
up to plateau at 11e-3. Slight overshooting in both cases.
Figure 2 reports the same for the long run identi￿cation, which corresponds to the exercise
done by Gal￿ (1999). As before, to the left we have the impulse responses to long run tech-
nology shocks. As it can be seen, these ￿gures reproduce Gal￿-Rabanal Fig. 2 almost exactly.
Productivity jumps to plateau at 7e-3. This positive technology shock causes persistent fall in
hours (hitting -2.5e-3 at t=2, negative until t=5), which then overshoots slightly and dies out.
That is, the long run technology shock drives labor down while having a permanent impact on
labor productivity. Notice that the magnitude of the change in PTY is almost the same as in
the short run technology shock.
7To the right, the impulse responses to long run nontechnology shocks show how productivity
jumps up in ￿rst year to around 4e-3 to substantially overshooting down in second year to -1e-3,
and ￿nally, converges back to zero. Hours jump to 7e-3, overshoot to 15e-3, and then plateau to
12e-3. This last impulse response function is very close to that after a short run nontechnology
shock.
Right now the analysis has focused mainly on the unconditional comovement of labor pro-
ductivity and hours after the shock. Contrary to RBC theory, Gal￿ ￿nds a negative correlation
between labor productivity and hours after a technology shock. So the immediate question
arises: what is driving business cycles, then? To answer this question, we compute the business
cycle series for labor productivity and hours implied by this VAR speci￿cation conditional on
long run technology and nontechnology shocks.2 This is displayed in Figures 3 and 4.
First, in Figure 3 we show the behavior of labor productivity and hours conditional on
short run technology shocks (top panel) and nontechnology shocks (bottom panel). For the
technology shock, we can see that there is a strong positive correlation of productivity and hours
resulting from short run technology shocks, with productivity substantially leading. Regarding
short run nontechnology shocks, there is a mildly negative correlation between productivity
and hours, strongly so after 1990. (These shocks clearly play an important role in the short
run identi￿cation of the fall in hours during the 1991 and 2001 recessions, where productivity
appears countercyclical). Interestingly, under the short run identi￿cation, technology shocks
appear to explain most of the cycle, though nontechnology shocks become important after 1990.
Figure 4 is parallel to the previous one but for the long run identi￿ed shocks. More concretely,
for the long run technology shock (top), there is a strong NEGATIVE correlation between growth
rates of productivity and hours, as Gal￿ claims. In levels, this shock appears to pick up much
of the "productivity slowdown", but only causes small acyclical ￿ uctuations in hours. That
is, consistently with Gal￿￿ s results, we obtain that long run technology shocks are not relevant
for business cycles. The predicted series for hours is quite stable, and the labor productivity
2Notice that at this point our analysis di⁄ers from Gal￿￿ s. This author reports the business cycle frequency
data for GDP and hours, HP detrended and in logs, whereas we report the conditional cycle implied by the two
shocks for the variables we are considering: labor productivity and hours. With these two series at hand, it would
be very easy to recover the GDP cycle.
8hours shows the productivity slowdown of the 80s. However, there is a remarkably part of the
variations of both series that cannot be explained by technology shocks.
For the long run nontechnology shock (bottom), we ￿nd a clear positive correlation between
productivity and hours, with hours lagging. The business cycle ￿ uctuation in hours is attributed
to this shock, as Gal￿ claims. That is, we obtain that both series, labor productivity and hours,
go together for most of the sample considered. Moreover, the predicted series capture the main
recessions in the US, mainly the 1973 recession and the 1982 recession.
Summarizing, using this VAR speci￿cation, we can reproduce Gali-Rabanal results quite
exactly using their data. Besides, Gal￿￿ s results seem to be quite robust in the sense that
technology shocks seem to be unrelated to the business cycle.
Conclusions from 19 Oct 2005 (especially b and d):
1. Qualitative results are relatively robust, but there are nontrivial quantitative changes even
from small changes in the sample.
2. As Gali-Rabanal claim, under LONG RUN identi￿cation, nontechnology shocks are clearly
responsible for the recognized (NBER etc.) business cycles.
Further results:
3. Results from series with nonzero mean (191005a and c) are always more or less qualitatively
consistent with results found from demeaned series (191005b and d). But quantitative
di⁄erences are quite large. In particular, hours do NOT initially fall due to LR tech shock
here in 19100a, whereas they do initially fall strongly in 191005b.
4. Interesting observation: productivity appears countercyclical after 1990. Nonetheless,
restricting the sample to 1947-89 does not appear to have any major qualitative e⁄ects on
the results (output not saved here, but easy to reproduce with the program).
96 Reproducing Beaudry and Portier￿ s results
In this section we turn to the results reported by Beaudry and Portier (2003). We estimate a
bivariate VAR in levels for the log of TFP and stock prices for the US during 1950:1-2002:1.
Following Beaudry and Portier we consider two alternative identi￿cations. Figures 5 and 6 report
the impulse response functions corresponding to short run and long run shocks, respectively. In
each ￿gure, the left column refers to technology shocks and the right column to nontechnology
shocks, and the top panel to TFP and bottom panel to stock prices.
The following results stand out. As Beaudry and Portier obtain, a short run shock to stock
prices has a permanent e⁄ect on productivity measured as TFP. However, it￿ s also true that all
four VAR speci￿cations yield SR NONTECH IRFs very similar to those of BP. That is, initial
impact on productivity is zero (by construction), converging in about a year to plateau around
5e-3; stock prices jump to 50e-3, then converge to a plateau around 90e-3, except in 211005c,
where they thereafter appear to tend slowly back towards zero. Interestingly, a long run shock
to TFP re￿ ects almost the same e⁄ect on TFP as the shock run shock to stock prices. In both
cases, productivity and stock prices go up. Our estimation is successful therefore in replicating
the shape of the impulse response functions, however, we cannot account for the magnitude of
the changes as reported by Beaudry and Portier.
Main di⁄erence between SR NONTECH IRFs and LR TECH IRFs is one of relative magni-
tude. Shape of IRFs is usually similar, but productivity rises more (relative to SP500) in case
of LR tech than in case of SR nontech.
If we complete the analysis in parallel to Gal￿￿ s results, and compute the business cycle
implied by this estimation we obtain the following. Figures 7 and 8 shows the predicted series for
TFP and stock prices conditional on short run and long run technology (top) and nontechnology
(bottom) shocks. First, we observe that stock prices are much more volatile than TFP as
expected. The predicted series for stock prices captures the main recessions of the 70s and the
80s. Figure 8 shows the same series conditional on the long run nontechnology shock. This time
this component cannot explain the business cycle. We can only observe in the 2000 the bubble.
10As a conclusion, according to this speci￿cation and identi￿cation, technology shocks are
important for the cycle, in contradiction with Gal￿￿ s results. However, we cannot reject the fact
that nontechnology shocks also play a role in the business cycle.
Conclusions:
1. Both in di⁄erences and in levels, LR TECH picks up most business cycle variation
2. But SR TECH often picks up business cycles too
3. In fact, unlike B-P, we consistently ￿nd much higher correlation of the SR tech shock
(instead of the SR nontech shock) with the LR tech shock!!
7 Comparing short-run and long-run speci￿cations
GAL˝ (19 Oct 05)
B-P and Alternative shock series comparison: Strong negative correlation between eps2sr
and eps1lr (-0.43). Less strong positive correlation between eps1sr and eps1lr (0.90).
B-P impulse response comparison: Completely di⁄erent responses: SR nontech makes pro-
ductivity and hours go permanently in opposite directions; LR tech makes productivity go up
but hours go temporarily down.
SR-LR tech impulse response comparison: Shape of impulse responses is similar. Produc-
tivity jumps up permanently by same amount in both cases. For SR tech, hours are initially
unchanged, then converge up to plateau; for LR tech, hours initially fall, then converge up to
their starting point. responses: SR nontech makes productivity and hours go permanently in
opposite directions; LR tech makes productivity go up but hours go temporarily down.
BEAUDRY AND PORTIER (21 Oct 05)
B-P estimated structural shock series comparison: strong positive correlation between eps2sr
and eps1lr: 0.56962. Much higher positive correlation between eps1sr and eps1lr: 0.81654. This
points towards the direction that both shocks matter: technology and nontechnology shocks.
B-P impulse response comparison: this replicates BP result that a shock to stock prices in
the short run has a long term impact on productivity. And so does the long run technology
shock.
11Regarding SR-LR technology impulse response comparison: again the shapes are very similar
to those impulse response functions in B-P comparison. That is, there is not such a big di⁄erence
between short run shocks or long run shocks with respect to the e⁄ects on productivity in the
long run.
7.1 Alternative speci￿cations
Before turning to the 3x3 VAR results, we check for robustness on the use of alternative variables
for productivity. First, we reproduced the same exercise as Gal￿ but using TFP instead of labor
productivity. We ￿nd that using BP-TFP makes technology shocks more important for the
business cycle, both for SR identi￿cation and for LR identi￿cation. A possible explanation is
that since BP-TFP follows the cycle more closely, it is easier for the component which drives
productivity improvements also to pick up business cycle ￿ uctuations.
Next, we do the opposite with Beaudry and Portier￿ s speci￿cation, that is, we run their VAR
using labor productivity instead of TFP. The results show that the long run tech shock always
picks up most of the business cycle. Also, long run nontech always picks up a lot of stock market
variation, which is negatively correlated with the small movements in productivity. Using labor
productivity in place of TFP makes the SR tech shock more similar to the long run tech shock,
and makes the SR nontech shock less similar. That is, using labor productivity in place of TFP
weakens the B-P claim that LR tech is positively correlated with SR nontech. B-P estimated
structural shock series and SR-LR estimated structural tech shock series correlations 0.37554
and 0.92893, respectively. That is, using labor productivity makes SR and LR tech shocks very
strongly correlated, a lot more than with TFP. Therefore the correlation of the LR tech shock
with the SR nontech shock (the B-P correlation) falls.
8 Estimating the 3x3 VAR
Given these apparently contradicting results, the immediate next step is to put together both
points of view and estimate a trivariate VAR in productivity, hours and stock prices. Our hy-
pothesis to test is that if both identi￿cations are correct, then they should capture di⁄erent
12types of shocks. If not, then we should check whether the di⁄erences are due to the alterna-
tive variables included (hours or stock prices), the de￿nition for productivity (TFP or labor
productivity) or the model estimated (VAR versus VECM).















where now we add a new variable (stock prices for the case of Gal￿, or hours for the case of
Beaudry and Portier), and in addition we obtain a new shock, ￿3;t we need to identify. As in
the sections above, we proceed with the two alternative identi￿cation methods: short run and
long run. The short run identi￿cation will yield three shocks that we denote [￿1;t;￿2;t;￿3;t]
0 and
the long run identi￿cation will be [~ ￿1;t;~ ￿2;t;~ ￿3;t]
0 :
Figure 9 shows the impulse response functions to a shock to productivity and a shock
to hours for the long run identi￿cation, which we will call Gal￿￿ s speci￿cation. The panels
report the e⁄ects on productivity, hours and stock prices. These IRFs are obtained using
[￿log(labprod);￿log(hours);￿log(SP500)]; that is, Gal￿￿ s speci￿cation adding stock prices.
From the left panels (a long run shock to productivity), it is clear that both results (Gal￿￿ s
and BP￿ s) are reproduced. That is, a long run shock to productivity drives hours down and
stock prices go up. As Gal￿ claims, long run technology shock implies a decrease in hours in the
baseline Gal￿ speci￿cation. The right panels show what Gal￿ would call a nontechnology shock,
in this case, a long run shock to hours. Again, we obtain Gal￿￿ s results that productivity goes
up to converge immediately to zero.
As a conclusion, the inclusion of an additional explanatory variable in the VAR does not
alter Gal￿￿ s results. Figure 10 reports the implied cumulated series for labor productivity, hours
and stock prices. In the baseline Gal￿ speci￿cation, the long run technology shock yields recog-
nizable business cycle movements in productivity and SP500, but these are associated with
COUNTERCYCLICAL hours movements. Also, the long run shock is responsible for a positive
comovement between the three variables near business cycle dates.
An immediate question is to check whether these results are changed if we use TFP as a mea-
sure of productivity instead of labor productivity, as Gal￿ does. Figure 11 reports the same analy-
sis but using the baseline Beaudry and Portier￿ s speci￿cation, that is, [￿log(TFP);￿log(hours);
13￿log(SP500)]; and comparing short run shock to stock prices versus the long run shock to pro-
ductivity. Beaudry and Portier results are reproduced here, that is in both cases a permanent
e⁄ect on productivity.
As Beaudry and Portier claim, the long run technology shock implies an increase in all
three series, and picks up an important business cycle component. Furthermore, this long run
technology shock is strongly positively correlated with the short run shock to stock prices (though
it is even more strongly positively correlated with the short run technology shock). However,
the long run shock to productivity does not show the fall in hours reported by Gal￿. That is,
surprisingly, when we consider TFP as a measure of productivity instead of labor productivity,
hours do not fall after a long run shock to TFP. That is, when running the 3x3 Beaudry and
Portier VAR with labor productivity instead of TFP, it is di¢ cult to pick up any component
that is strongly correlated with the business cycle (probably because labor productivity is less
cyclical).
Summarizing, both 3x3 Gal￿ and 3x3 Beaudry and Portier baselines do a fairly good job of
reproducing the results of the corresponding 2x2 baselines!! So arguably, the inclusion of these
three variables is LESS IMPORTANT than the choice of TFP or labor productivity.
8.1 Robustness
The 3x3 VAR analysis done above intends to compare Gal￿ with Beaudry and Portier by including
all three variables. But in addition to the change in the second variable, there are three other
di⁄erences between the two papers:
￿ Run in di⁄erences versus run in levels (or VECM)
￿ Express last variables in per capita terms (BP) versus in aggregate terms (Gal￿)
￿ Alternative ordering of variables in VAR
[VAR in LEVELS versus DIFFERENCES]
To check whether this failure was only due to the de￿nition of productivity and not to other
speci￿cation in the estimation we compared the output of a VAR in di⁄erences and in levels.
If we estimate a VAR in levels, we obtain the same result as in Christiano et al., that is, hours
14jump up slightly after an increase in productivity. Under this speci￿cation, technology shocks
matter a lot for the cycle (both in the short and long run), whereas nontechnology shocks are
also important, although they report a negative correlation between productivity and hours.
For the Gal￿￿ s speci￿cation, either using TFP in place of labor productivity, or running in levels
instead of di⁄erences, su¢ ces to eliminate Gali￿ s result of a signi￿cant fall in labor after a positive
technology shock. Also, either using TFP in place of labor productivity, or running in levels
instead of di⁄erences, makes long run technology shocks important for business cycles.
For the Beaudry and Portier speci￿cation (already mentioned) As BP claim, the long run
technology shock implies an increase in all three series, and picks up an important business cycle
component. (already mentioned) As BP claim, LR tech is strongly positively correlated with
last SR shock (though it is even more strongly positively correlated with the SR tech shock).
The two previous results hold both for LVAR and DVAR, if TFP is used. So arguably, the
inclusion of these three variables is LESS IMPORTANT than the choice of TFP or LP, and the
choice of DVAR or LVAR.
Surprising degree of similarity between BP comparison graphs in Gal￿ 021105Gb (Gal￿ DVAR
using TFP) and BP 011105BPa (BP LVAR using TFP). In other words, just using TFP in a
3x3 VAR based on Gal￿ brings us closer to BP results than to Gal￿ results.
In all of the runs based on TFP (and also when we run Gal￿ VAR in levels), long run
technology shocks explain much of the business cycle.
[TOTAL vs PER CAPITA data]
We also compared the estimation for alternative scales of the data, total versus per capita
data. The di⁄erences are nil.
Finally, it is using Beaudry and Portier￿ s TFP instead of Gal￿￿ s labor productivity what
makes technology shocks more important for the business cycle. The reason is that BP￿ s measure
follows the cycle more closely.
[ALTERNATIVE ORDERING OF THE VARIABLES]
If we run the 3x3 VAR from above but using an alternative ordering of the variables, in
particular [￿log(TFP);￿log(SP500);￿log(hours)]; we obtain that using labor productivity,
Gal￿￿ s results are robust to any alternative ordering of these three variables. However, this
15result is lost when we use TFP instead of labor productivity, independently of the ordering
of the variables. At the same time, this ordering with TFP and using Beaudry and Portier￿ s
speci￿cation also maintains the same results, that is a short run shock to stock prices has the
same permanent e⁄ects on productivity as the long run shock to productivity. So both results
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18A Gal￿￿ s identi￿cation






































Figure 1: Impulse response functions: technology and nontechnology shocks, short run
identi￿cation



































Figure 2: Impulse response functions: technology and nontechnology shocks, long run
identi￿cation






Conditional on SR tech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and HOURS(dots)







Conditional on SR NONtech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and HOURS (dots)
Figure 3: Cummulative series, short run identi￿cation.







Conditional on LR tech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and HOURS (dots)






Conditional on LR NONtech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and HOURS (dots)
Figure 4: Cummulative series, long run identi￿cation.
20B Beaudry and Portier￿ s identi￿cation





































Figure 5: Impulse response functions: technology and nontechnology shocks, short run
identi￿cation









































Figure 6: Impulse response functions: technology and nontechnology shocks, long run
identi￿cation







Conditional on SR tech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and SP500(dots)







Conditional on SR NONtech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and SP500 (dots)
Figure 7: Cummulative series, short run identi￿cation.









Conditional on LR tech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and SP500 (dots)






Conditional on LR NONtech: predicted LEVEL of PTY (dash) and SP500 (dots)
Figure 8: Cummulative series, long run identi￿cation.
22C 3x3 VAR
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Figure 9: Gal￿￿ s speci￿cation, 3x3 VAR.






-3 Shock to stock prices
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Figure 10: Beaudry and Portier￿ s speci￿cation: 3x3 VAR.
Left panel: short run identi￿cation. Right panel: long run identi￿cation.
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